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 Chapter 13 
 Water Resources, Cooperation and Power 
Asymmetries in the Water Management 
of the Lower Jordan Valley: The Situation 
Today and the Path that Has Led There 
 Christine  Bismuth 
 Abstract  This chapter aims at providing an overview of the uses and the state of 
the water resources in the Lower Jordan Basin. The years 2007/2008 serve as a base 
line to describe the speciﬁ c situation, marked by a succession of drought years 
 during the ﬁ rst decade of the twenty-ﬁ rst century. An overview of the major treaties 
and agreements between the riparians and implications on the water management 
situation is presented. The nature of the relations between the different parties is 
analysed. 
 Keywords  Water resources •  Lower Jordan Basin •  Yarmuk •  Dead Sea •  Red Sea • 
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13.1  Water Resources of the Lower Jordan Basin 
 The Red Sea–Dead Sea (RSDS) Conveyance Project is the latest attempt to widen 
the range of available solutions to overcome the water stress in the Lower Jordan 
Basin and to stabilise the level of the Dead Sea. One of the major arguments for the 
RSDS Conveyance Project from its supporters is that no other options for long- 
lasting solutions are available. This argument is contested by most of the environ-
mental protection groups, who fear the associated risks of the project for the Arava 
valley, the Dead Sea and the Red Sea itself. Those groups push for more water 
conserving solutions. 
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 In order to understand the present situation of the Lower Jordan Basin and the 
impact of the planned project, a comprehensive view on the development and use of 
the water resources in the region is compulsory. Not only decisions with regard to 
water management but also institutional and societal settings had inﬂ uence on the 
status of the water resources, the choices taken and the remaining options. 
 During the last 50 years, the Lower Jordan Basin was subject to important 
changes, resulting in distinct consequences for both the region’s water resources 
and the Dead Sea as the ﬁ nal recipient of the Jordan River. 
 It is quite a challenge to provide a comprehensive overview of the region’s water 
balances for the following reasons:
•  Statistical data and methods vary between the different main riparians Israel, 
Palestine and Jordan, a common methodology is not applied. 
•  Due to the different conveyance systems (Israel’s National Water Carrier, “Disi” 
conveyance system, desalinated seawater conveyance), it is not possible to 
restrict the observations to the Lower Jordan Basin. Instead, the water databases 
from Israel, Jordan and the West Bank have to be taken into account. 
•  Water data for the Kingdom of Jordan are partly based on projections as in the 
case of developed surface water sources. Climate change scenarios, which sug-
gest a signiﬁ cant decrease in precipitation rates for the region, are not fully 
included in the projections. 
•  Even though groundwater abstraction and groundwater levels are regularly mea-
sured by the Israeli Water Authority (IWA) and its Hydrological Service, the latest 
groundwater data published in 2013 by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 
(ICBS) date from 2008. Since that period, water management in Israel has changed, 
and the most recent data on use and availability of water resources are in fact from 
2013 (Israel Water Authority  2014 ). In its reports, the IWA does not distinguish 
between groundwater and surface water sources, but differentiates between various 
qualities of the consumed water (recycled, brackish, saline or potable). 
•  As the Israeli water distribution system stretches over the West Bank, groundwa-
ter resources are partially used jointly, whereas Palestinians have no direct access 
to Jordan. From an outside perspective, it is most difﬁ cult to identify Palestinian 
and Israeli water sources and abstractions. 
•  Another point of imprecise and controversial information is the quantity of water, 
which the Kingdom of Jordan receives from Syria via the Yarmuk River. The 
Jordanian–Syrian agreement on use of the water of the Yarmuk has ﬁ xed 
200 × 10 6 m 3 /year for Jordan. In fact, Jordan does not receive more than 
50 × 10 6 m 3 /year according to Prof. Salameh, member of the Jordan Royal Water 
Committee (Shami  2013 ). 
•  The ﬁ gures which we present in Figs.  13.2 and  13.3 are in fact not values for the 
Lower Jordan Basin but values for Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. Because of 
the water transfers into the basin, the unknown exact locations of the abstrac-
tions, especially from the West Bank, we cannot draw a picture for the Lower 
Jordan Basin, but we look on the entity of the three countries. For simplistic 
reasons, we call that entity “Lower Jordan Basin”. Another source of imprecise 
information is the division between the West Bank and Gaza strip. Under correct 
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circumstances, the ﬁ gures for water uses of the Gaza strip should not have been 
included, and the water inﬂ ow from Israel into Gaza should have been taken into 
consideration. But as we cannot make a point with concern to exact and veriﬁ ed 
information concerning the West Bank and Gaza, we consider the resulting dif-
ferences as negligible as they would not change the overall picture. 
 Keeping in mind those limitations, an overview of the water balance of the Dead 
Sea is presented in Fig.  13.1 and for the Lower Jordan Basin in Fig.  13.3 .
 Fig. 13.1  Natural and present water balance of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea (Source: 
UN-ESCWA and BGR  2013 . Source: Compiled by ESCWA-BGR based on Courcier et al.  2005 ; 
GRDC  2011 , HSI 1944–2008) 
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 While the inﬂ ow to Lake Tiberias did not show important variations since the 
1950s, the outﬂ ow of the lake into Jordan was considerably reduced by the diversion 
of the lake’s waters into Israel’s National Water Carrier. The National Water Carrier 
transports the water from the northern part of Israel to the southern parts. The carrier 
provides both drinking water and water for irrigation to Israel. In order to enhance 
the quality of the water in the carrier, saline sources of the lake have been diverted 
away from the lake into Jordan, raising its salinity levels. 
 Water abstraction from Jordan itself and the Yarmuk, as one of its major tributar-
ies, has increased signiﬁ cantly over the years, resulting in a minor inﬂ ow of 
20–200 × 10 6 m 3 /year into the Dead Sea, compared to an inﬂ ow of about 1,3 × 10 9 m 3 /
year 60 years ago. 
 A further 200–300 × 10 6 m 3 /year is abstracted from the Dead Sea itself by the 
Jordanian and Israeli Dead Sea potash companies. According to the survey of 
TAHAL and Geological Survey of Israel (GSI) ( 2011 , p. 5), a minimum inﬂ ow of 
700 × 10 6 m 3 /year would be indispensable to stabilise the current sea level. 
 Addition of all abstractions leads to the known consequence for the Dead Sea: Its 
level is declining with a rate of about 1 m annually (Bismuth et al.  2015a , in this 
volume, pp. 89–98). 
13.1.1  Water Uses and Water Abstractions 
 The different uses for Israel, the Palestine territories and Jordan are presented in 
Fig.  13.2 . Agriculture is the most important water user in the region, even though its 
contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) is rather low with 3.3 % for Jordan 
(World Bank  2013a , p. 23) and 1.4 % for Israel ( 2012 GDP at current prices, Israel 
Central Bureau of Statistics ( 2013 ). In 2008, the GDP for agriculture in the Palestinian 
Territories was 4.8 % (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute  2010 ).
 Figure  13.3 shows the water abstraction for Israel, Jordan and the West Bank 
by type of source. The data do not present abstractions from non-approved wells 
in the West Bank and in Jordan. The Palestinian Water Authority does reveal 
information neither on the use of desalinated water nor on wastewater. According 
to the same sources, existing storm water harvesting structures (dams, cisterns 
and agricultural ponds in the West Bank) have a bulk potential of around 
5.45 × 10 6 m 3 (Palestinian Water Authority  2012 ). But as neither the year nor the 
actual volumes of abstractions are pointed out, and the amount is quite negligible, 
we did not consider this value.
 We have selected the year 2007 in order to use a comparable data basis for Jordan 
and Israel. The years 2007 and 2008 mark the climax of a sequence of drought years 
and turning points in water policies, namely, the construction of major seawater 
desalination facilities at the Mediterranean shore and key administrative and legal 
reforms. Therefore, data from those years appear to provide a valid basis to evaluate 
progress and failures. Changes in the use and abstraction of water in Israel from 2007 
until now will be discussed in Bismuth et al. ( 2015b , in this volume, pp. 253–275). 
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Palestine Jordan Israel Total
Industrial 29 59 327 415
Domestic 200 284 560 1,044

























Annual Water Uses in Israel, the Palestine Territories
and Jordan (106 m3/yr) 
 Fig. 13.2  Water uses in Israel, the Palestine Territories and Jordan (Source: 2007 data for Israel 
are derived from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics ( 2012 ), data for Palestine are based on FAO 
Aquastat ( 2014 ) and data for Jordan are taken from Jordan Ministry for Water and Irrigation 








































Annual Water Abstraction by Type of Source (106 m3/yr)
Desalinated Water Treated Waste Water Surface Water Groundwater
 Fig. 13.3  Water abstraction by type of source (Source: 2007 data for Israel are from the Israel 
Central Bureau of Statistics ( 2012 , p. 19), 2007 data for Jordan are from Jordan Ministry for Water 
and Irrigation ( 2009 , p. 1–6) and 2011 data for the West Bank are from the Palestinian Water 
Authority ( 2012 , p. 26)) 
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 In 2007, groundwater has been the most important source of water uses in the 
Lower Jordan Basin. The total water abstraction for 2007 summed up to about 
3131 × 10 6 m 3 . Israel released around 234 × 10 6 m 3 after use to the subsurface of 
which 88 × 10 6 m 3 is lost due to leakages. Jordan released around 55 × 10 6 m 3 to 
the subsurface with the share of losses probably being much higher as the unac-
counted water in the municipals, which is around 50 % (Jordan Ministry for Water 
and Irrigation  2009 ) and 30 % for the Palestine territories (Palestinian Water 
Authority  2012 ). 
13.1.2  Water Balance 
 The overall water balance for the region is presented in Fig.  13.4 . We calculated a 







































Desalinated water Effluents Average annual recharge Total
Annual Water Balance for Israel, Westbank and Jordan Based on Data
from 2004 and 2007 (106m/yr)
 Fig. 13.4  Water balance for Israel, the West Bank and Jordan based on 2004 and 2007 data. 
Source: According to Weinberger et al. ( 2012 , Table 4), the total average annual recharge for Israel 
and the West Bank 1631 × 10 6 m 3 was calculated on a period from 1993 to 2009. 2007 data for 
desalinated water and for efﬂ uents were derived from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics ( 2012 , 
Table 7 and p. 20). For Jordan, we calculated the average annual recharge, the efﬂ uents and the 
amount of desalinated water on a very conservative basis, based on the data from the Jordan 
National Master Plan from 2004 (Jordan Ministry for Water and Irrigation and German Technical 
Cooperation  2004 , p. 48, Table 3.1 and p. 54) and from Water for Life (Jordan Ministry for Water 




 To compensate for a part of the deﬁ cit, Jordan used 91 × 10 6 m 3 from nonrenew-
able groundwater sources in 2007. The most prominent aquifer is the “Disi” aquifer, 
a transboundary fossil groundwater resource shared with Saudi Arabia. 
13.1.3  Environmental Consequences of Current Water Uses 
 Salt water intrusion to the coastal aquifers, signiﬁ cant decreases in the groundwater 
levels and resulting rising salinity levels were some of the hidden consequences of 
the unsustainable water uses. The crossing of the “Lower Red Line” in Lake Tiberias 
(Markel et al.  2014 ) marks the threshold where negative ecological consequences 
occur and where obvious and negative consequences for the National Water Carrier 
are most probable (see Fig.  13.5 ). The “Red Line” is a precautionary line deﬁ ned by 
the Israeli Water Authority. A continuously lowered water level will lead to rapid 
salinisation due to penetration of saline water from underground sources into the 
aquifer (Haran et al.  2008 ).
 For the Lower Jordan River itself, only 5 % of its natural ﬂ ow is left. By diverting 
the saline springs of Lake Tiberias, the salinity in the river raised. The remaining 
water originates from agricultural runoffs, poorly treated efﬂ uents and drainage 
waters (Bamya et al.  2012 ). 
13.1.4  Climate and Demography 
 Precipitation rates in the region show a high seasonal and annual variability. 
Comparisons between the average recharge from rainfall estimates for the period 
1973 to 1992 with those for the period from 1993 to 2009 show a decline of 11 % 
for Israel and the Palestinian Territories. For the Lake Tiberias basin as the most 






































































 Fig. 13.5  Lake Tiberias lake levels (Source: Markel et al.  2014 ) 
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high with more than 13 % (Weinberger et al.  2012 ). Regional climate change impact 
will most probably lead to decreasing precipitation rates and increase drought 
events (IPCC  2013 ). 
 Expected population growth will aggravate the water scarcity problems. For all 
concerned stakeholders such as the water authorities and “the Friends of the Earth 
Middle East”, it is evident that traditional water management offers no solution and 
that demand and supply management has to be altered. 
13.1.5  Proposed Strategies 
 Increasing environmental concerns about the state of the water resources and the 
environment are calling for the rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan ﬂ ows. The partial 
restoration of the Lower Jordan River is an economically viable option as additional 
income for the riparian populations could be generated from the beneﬁ ts (Becker 
et al.  2014 ). 
 Israel reacted to the water crisis with an enforced building of seawater desalina-
tion facilities and wastewater treatment plants for the reuse of water and with exten-
sive structural and price reforms. The challenges and beneﬁ ts of those reforms are 
discussed in Bismuth et al. ( 2015b , in this volume, pp. 253–275). 
 Jordan equally started to implement measures like building the “Disi” Aquifer 
Conveyance Project, aiming to use the fossil waters of this groundwater resource. 
The recently inaugurated “Disi” pipeline will provide Jordan with an additional 
annual supply in the order of 100 × 10 6 m 3 for the next 20–30 years depending on 
abstraction rates. Consequences of existing use practices and speciﬁ c challenges for 
Jordan are addressed in Chap.  15 (Yorke  2015 , in this volume, pp. 227–251). 
 Setting up a seawater desalination plant at Aqaba combined with a conveyance 
of the remaining brine to the Dead Sea is part of the planned RSDS Conveyance 
Project. This project and its alternatives will be presented in Malkawi and Tsur 
( 2015 , in this volume, pp. 205–225). 
13.2  History of Water Confl icts, Cooperation and Treaties 
 The existing water accords play an important role for the deﬁ nition of rules for 
the management of the common water resources. They also have an inﬂ uence on 
the abstraction rates and the exchange of water between the riparians. A trilateral 
project like the RSDS Conveyance Project further demands some level of coop-
eration. Therefore, we will shortly present the main and relevant agreements in 




13.2.1  The Johnston Plan 
 In 1953, the United States sent a special envoy, Eric Johnston, to the region in order 
to mediate an agreement on the Jordan River allocations, later called the Johnston 
Plan. Though the parties never formally ratiﬁ ed the plan, they have initially adhered 
to it. According to the plan, 400 × 10 6 m 3 per year were allocated to Israel, 
720 × 10 6 m 3 to Jordan and 132 × 10 6 m 3 to Syria (Phillips et al.  2007 ). But in the 
1960s, the parties began to develop projects in excess of the Johnston allocations. 
This could be considered as one of the reasons for the 1967 war, which gave Israel 
control over two of the three Jordan headwaters: the entire Lower Jordan River and 
the Mountain Aquifers in the West Bank (Wolf  2000 ). The latter are of strategic 
importance for Israel’s provision with groundwater, as major springs in Israel are 
alimented by those aquifers (Baumgarten  2010 ). Even though the Johnston Plan is 
frequently cited as a basis for cooperation agreements between the concerned par-
ties, it falls short in view of sustainable groundwater uses, environmental needs and 
the impacts of population growth and climate change on the availability of water 
resources (Mager  2015 ). 
13.2.2  The Agreement Concerning the Utilisation 
of the Yarmuk Waters 
 Jordan signed an agreement with Syria concerning the utilisation of the waters of 
the Yarmuk River (Syrian Arab Rebublic and Jordan  1987 ). The agreement foresaw 
the establishment of a joint Syria–Jordan Commission for the implementation of 
the dam-building works at Maqarin. The dam at the Yarmuk River was ﬁ nally 
realised in 2011 with a storage capacity of 110 × 10 6 m 3 . So far the dam’s reservoir 
remained unﬁ lled, as droughts and increased consumption in Syria have consider-
ably reduced the annual ﬂ ow of the Yarmuk River. Since the agreement was signed 
in 1987, more than 30 dams and more than 300 wells have been erected (UN-ESCWA 
and BGR  2013 ). 
13.2.3  The Peace Treaty Between Israel and Jordan 
 Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994 (Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty  1994 ). 
The peace treaty refers implicitly to the three main principles of international cus-
tomary water law (rule of equitable and reasonable utilisation, the no-harm rule and 
the duty to cooperate), but adapts them to the special political situation. The water 
issues between the two states are settled in Article 6 and in Annex II of the treaty. 
The parties agree on the allocations of the shared water resources from Yarmuk and 
Jordan: In the summer season, Israel receives 12 × 10 6 m 3 from the Yarmuk River, 
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and Jordan receives the remaining waters, while Israel is allowed to obtain 
13 × 10 6 m 3 during the winter period. The parties agreed also on a storage system, 
which permits the storage of 20 × 10 6 m 3 allocation during the summer period. In 
Article 7 of Annex II, the establishment of a Joint Water Committee comprised of 
three members from each country is ﬁ xed. The cooperation of water issues and the 
exchange of relevant data on water resources are synchronised by the Joint Water 
Committee. The Joint Water Committee shall survey existing uses for documenta-
tion and prevention of appreciable harm. The treaty foresees also the joint establish-
ment of monitoring stations and bans the disposal of wastewater in the rivers without 
treatment to standards allowing the unrestricted agricultural use. 
 In fact the Jordan–Israel Peace Treaty is the legal foundation for the development 
of the Red Sea–Dead Sea (RSDS) Conveyance Project. Israel and Jordan admitted 
the fact that the natural water resources are not sufﬁ cient to meet their needs. The 
parties agreed to cooperate in the development of new water resources among oth-
ers, and Israel agreed to transfer desalinated water to Jordan. 
 The Jordan–Israel Peace Treaty of 1994 did not address any of the other riparian 
rights or any other aspect of the Jordan River basin except those of the Yarmuk and 
Jordan River. Any peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians with concern to 
water management will therefore interfere with the agreements settled in the 
Jordan–Israel Peace Treaty (Mager  2015 ). 
13.2.4  The Oslo II Agreement 
 The most important water issues of concern between Israel and Palestine are the use 
of the aquifers located in the West Bank, the Eastern, Western and North-Eastern 
Mountain Aquifers, and the sharing of their resources. The share and distribution of 
the water resources and the establishment of a Palestinian Water Administration 
Authority were settled in Annex III, Article 40 of the Oslo II Agreement (Israeli–
Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) 28 September  1995 , pp. 318 ff.). In essence 
the Oslo II Agreement gives the Palestinians the right to establish a Water 
Administration Authority and acknowledges for the ﬁ rst time in principle Palestinian 
water rights. The future water demands for the Palestinians have been mutually 
agreed to be around 70–80 × 10 6 m 3 per year. The exact allocation is postponed to 
the Permanent Status Negotiations and Agreement. 
 The two parties agreed to establish a Joint Water Committee (JWC) for the 
interim period until a peace treaty between the Palestinians and the Israelis will be 
settled. Even though the Joint Water Committee has far reaching administrative 
responsibilities concerning the management of the water resources in reality, the 
JWC led to the formalisation of discriminatory management practices (Baumgarten 
 2010 , p. 189). All development projects are under the condition of prior approval by 
the JWC, but as all decisions of the JWC should be reached by consensus, Israel got 
a de facto veto right. Furthermore, projects outside the areas under administration of 
the Palestinian Authority (A and B) need the approval of the civil administration, 
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which represents a branch of the Israeli Defence Ministry. This required approval 
delays necessary projects as it is a long bureaucratic process (The Knesset  2011 ). As 
a consequence, the Palestinians are not able to develop their water resources or 
projects in the desired way. 
 But also the Palestinians denied approval to some of the proposed projects, as 
they would serve some of the interests of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 
The Palestinian side categorically turns down any cooperation with the Israeli 
settlements. 1 
 In fact, the JWC in its present form and under the present political circumstances 
is not an effective instrument to derive solutions and settle conﬂ icts for the most 
important water management problems of the West Bank, which are the old and 
insufﬁ cient potable water distribution network, the problem of not approved water 
abstractions, the lacking sewage collection and treatment and the pollution of the 
streams, wadis and groundwater sources. Fragmented institutions, limited gover-
nance due to the occupation and the split between the different Palestinian fractions 
resulted in the lack of environmental planning instruments, capacities, legislation 
and enforcement in Palestine. The political lock-in situation between Israel and 
Palestine concerning the peace process and the power asymmetries between the two 
parties has also led to an obstruction of the management of the shared water 
resources. Israel can be criticised for discriminatory water practices (Kislev  2008 ). 
According to Kislev, Palestinians receive only 60 % of the water share that Jewish 
settlements receive, and if water losses are taken into account, the ﬁ gure might even 
be less. 
13.2.5  The Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance 
Study Programme 
 Even though the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Programme under the 
World Bank represents neither a treaty nor an accord among the three riparians of 
the Lower Jordan, it represents a ﬁ rst common action within the institution of the 
World Bank between Israel, Jordan and the Palestine territories. We can draw some 
important lessons from the study programme both with concern to the relations 
between the riparians but also with concern to the planning process of the RSDS 
Conveyance Project as an example of a future MWEP. 
 As part of the Jordan–Israel Peace Treaty negotiations, the two parties conceived 
a concept to convey water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. As the scope of the 
project requires international funding, the concept had to be agreed by the Palestinian 
Authorities. This was done by the submission of a jointly signed letter to the World 
Bank dated 9 May 2005 requesting to coordinate donor ﬁ nancing and the manage-
1  Interview on 2 January 2014 with A. M. Hindi (Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian Water 
Authority, Director General National Water Council’s Unit) and R. A. El Sheikh (Palestinian Water 
Authority, Deputy Chairman) 
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ment of the implementation of the study programme (World Bank  2013b ). The three 
parties announced their agreement at the World Economic Forum at the Dead Sea in 
May 2005. To ﬁ nance the estimated costs of the study programme of USD 16 mil-
lion, the World Bank established a multi-donor trust for ﬁ nance. It took 5 years to 
establish the trust in 2010. The donors were France, Greece, Italy, Japan, South 
Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. 
 Initially, the study programme did not include the Study of Alternatives but 
only a feasibility study and the environment and social assessment study. It was 
due to the pressure of the environmental nongovernmental organisations that a 
study of alternatives was conducted as the last study within a series of different 
studies. 
 The terms of reference never considered investigating on the feasibility to gener-
ate energy from saline water, but the ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ces were considered in the 
study of alternatives Malkawi and Tsur ( 2015 , in this volume, pp. 205–225). This 
fact is crucial for the implementation of the polluters pay principle (Bismuth et al. 
 2015b , in this volume, pp. 253–275) and also for the overall costs of the project. 
 From the beginning of the study programme, the role of the Palestinian 
Authorities had been quite ambiguous: On the one side, they saw in the project an 
opportunity to achieve results for their creation of a Palestinian state, and, on the 
other side, the Palestinians in their majority opposed the project, which resulted 
in minor active participation in the Study of Alternatives. All three beneﬁ ciary 
parties proposed to the World Bank a list of experts to conduct the study, but on 
the Palestinian list, only non-Palestinians appeared. It is not that the Palestinians 
lack qualiﬁ ed expertise among their scientists, but ﬁ nally a British citizen (Tony 
Allen) was chosen as the expert to represent the Palestinian’s interests. The stake-
holder discussions on 20 and 21 February 2013 reﬂ ect this ambiguous position of 
the Palestinians between their needs for more water, their rights on land and 
resources, their opposition to Israel and the acknowledgements of the Jordanian 
water needs ( www.worldbank.org/rds ). The majority of the participants in the 
stakeholder forum would have preferred to settle water questions in the peace 
negotiation process, and they feared that with an agreement they would lose their 
rights on water and land. Some of the participants demanded the rights of the 
Palestinians to develop their own Potassium companies at the Dead Sea and to 
construct their own hotel sector at the sea shore, but without outlining where the 
additional water should come from. The stakeholder discussions in Israel on 18 
and 19 February 2013 reﬂ ected more on the environmental concerns but also on 
Israel’s concern to support Jordan in its quest for new water sources, while the 
Jordanian meetings on 14 and 17 February 2013 were centred around the ques-
tions of affordable water prices and the economic consequences of the project but 
also on security and safety aspects. 
 Only few participants raised the questions on the possible management and con-
trolling structures with regard to the complicated relational setting in the region. 
This aspect was not adequately addressed neither in the terms of references nor in 
the presented reports. 
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13.2.6  The Water Swap Memorandum of Understanding 
 The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (see Bismuth et al.  2015a , in this 
 volume, pp. 89–98) between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories concern-
ing the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project is the latest and most concrete 
agreement between the three parties. The negotiation process already for the agree-
ment to launch the feasibility study supported and conducted by the World Bank has 
turned out to be rather fastidious and time consuming as the Palestinians saw an 
opportunity to gain more inﬂ uence on the shared water resources between Israel and 
the Palestinian Territories and to use the project as a bargaining chip in the peace 
treaty negotiation process as well as an instrument to realise national sovereignty 
(Fischhendler et al.  2013 ). 
 While the MoU constitutes an intelligent cost saving solution for Jordan and 
Israel, based on mutual cooperation, the MoU does not provide any substantial solu-
tion for the manifold water management problems between Israelis and Palestinians. 
The approach as foreseen in the MoU reduces the problems between the two parties 
merely to quantitative aspects. 
 Detailed regulations will be ﬁ xed in bilateral accords between the parties. This 
facilitates the realisation of the Israeli–Jordanian agreements, as the approval to 
build the most needed seawater desalination plant at Aqaba will no longer depend 
on the Palestinians. But under the present political circumstances between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, it is more than unpredictable what this means for the 
realisation of the conveyance and any other actions undertaken to halt the further 
decline of the Dead Sea water level. Any common action for the safeguard of the 
Dead Sea appears to need a more comprehensive approach. 
13.3  Conclusions 
 The data on water uses, on abstractions and on available sources indicate clearly 
that already in 2007 the three riparians have been in a deﬁ ciency situation with 
important impacts on groundwater resources, river and lake ecosystems and the 
Dead Sea itself. The discussions within the RSDS Conveyance Study Programme 
conducted by the World Bank revealed that a technical solution is only one of 
the several assets required to halt the further decline of the Dead Sea. The results of 
the RSDS Study Programme do not provide proposals for adequate management, 
control structures and the ﬁ nancial conditions for such a major project, but also cost 
calculations speciﬁ cally for the part of the energy generation remain unsettled. 
 The existing bases for international cooperation are the different agreements 
between Israel and Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authorities and Jordan and 
Syria. All three accords (the Jordanian–Syrian agreements, the Jordan–Israel Peace 
Treaty and the Oslo II Agreement) have in common that they are ambiguous, vague 
and voluntary and leave room for interpretation for each party (Mager  2015 ). Rules 
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on compliance and control and mechanisms for mediation in case of a conﬂ ict 
between the parties are not established or not in operation, especially after 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 (Dombrowsky  2003 ). The accords might be 
sufﬁ cient for short-term planning and communication, but for a longer perspective 
and the establishment of a common coherent management strategy, they do not 
provide adequate structures. Furthermore, the agreements are inﬂ exible with regard 
to the challenges of regional climate change impacts or to newly arising issues, as 
they consolidate existing uses. 
 The agreements recognise only states as legitimate actors, which leads to cen-
tralisation and nationalisation of the water management. Both in Palestine and in 
Israel, the discourse on water is focused on the development of resources seen as a 
part of the nation-building effort (Trottier and Brooks  2013 ). 
 The nature of the relations between Israelis and Palestinians deﬁ nes the way how 
water management problems are addressed. The large power asymmetries between 
the two parties do not only impede the development of intelligent solutions, but they 
also prevent the Palestinians from developing their own objectives, based on neces-
sities but also on the availability of natural water resources and the principles of 
sustainability. 
 Shared water resources mean shared responsibilities and duties. With more water 
from Israeli desalination plants, quantitative problems might be eased, but nothing 
is gained to overcome existing power asymmetries or insufﬁ cient conﬂ ict mitigation 
instruments. Any measure which builds trust and mutual understanding is most 
needed in that region. What is furthermore needed is a frank discussion about carry-
ing capacities in the light of climate change and population growth and on the role 
of agriculture. 
 Shared water resources mean furthermore that data on the water resources have 
to be shared in a transparent and reliable way. That could be a ﬁ rst step towards trust 
building not only between the different countries but also in view of the citizens. 
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